Why They Were There: State Identity and the Civil War

Why They Were There: State Identity and the Civil War

Throughout the Civil War, there is a constant reference to states.  The obvious answer is that this represented the composition of the armies at that time.  It also demonstrates that each military unit carrying that state representation formed a shared identity among the soldiers.  The Confederate and Union armies both suffered from failures of leadership.  These failures put strain on the rank and file soldiers to which they turned to their state identity, to their fellow soldiers from the same state, to maintain the rationale for their personal sacrifice and remember why they were in the war at all.

Wars are fought by commissioned officers and, what we might term, ordinary soldiers.  For the American Civil War, their involvement was a far cry from blind adherence to a prescribed set of orders or ideology.  It was largely entered into by all as a quest for peace predicated more prominently upon identity to one’s specific state, rather than larger notions, such as abolition. 

Gallagher and Grimsley both paint a picture of the leadership of both the Confederate and Union armies.  After the Richmond Campaign of 1862, Robert E. Lee emerged as a savior of the Confederacy at a time when the South was suffering from low morale and no central military figure on which to hang future aspirations of sovereignty.  Richmond newspapers cite the “brilliancy of his genius” that had “entitled himself to the lasting gratitude of his country.” (160)  Meanwhile, the retreated Union army under McClellan was lamenting the loss of the Confederate capital, and with it, the hope that the war might end.  Brig. Gen. Philip Kearny cites McClellan’s “mismanagement” as the reason for their defeat and that only through the quick thinking of other lower officers saved the army from total ruin (156). Indeed, it was said of McClellan that his greatest ability was in organizing retreats (156). 

Grimsley, writing on the Overland Campaign in 1864, demonstrates the difficulties that both armies had with subordinate officers.  While Meade was the commanding general, his role had largely been subjugated by Grant.  Meade made no concerted effort to alter the situation.  The army was working smoothly and victory was happening; it was a case of not fixing was did not need to be fixed.  Even when a Congressional delegate visited him and awarded him the victories, Meade swept the credit to Grant.  For the sake of victory, for the sake of peace, subjugation was acceptable.  There were issues with Warren refusing to cooperate with any other general and most other regimental officers returning with unexpected, and disappointing, results.  Years after the fact, Grant would lament the fact that the East and West armies could not work together, which could have shortened the war.  Lee, on the other hand, had serious issues with subordinate officers.  Early on in the campaign, Lee could count on the service and obedience of Breckinridge and Beuregard.  This was offset by Hill’s inability to control his men, Stuart’s inability to recognize unfavorable conditions, and Anderson simply not performing. 

Rank and file soldiers faced whatever fate their commanding officers plotted.  Mistakes made by commanding generals to regimental officers stood to take life or limb from ordinary soldiers.  And, these soldiers could not escape the horrors they saw, in military and social actions.  Wilbur Fisk, a Union soldier, in 1863 discusses peace through a compromise between the North and South that would result in two separate countries.  Some soldiers would hear this message from those at ‘home’ and might consider it an assault on their honor, on their personal sacrifice and risk.  However, all parties desired peace.  Manning’s essay demonstrates that union soldiers, and indeed those not pitched in battle or clad in blue, upon interaction with slaves, saw the destruction of slavery as the only salvation from a war seen as God’s punishment for the sin and, in that destruction, peace.  Gettysburg (1993) demonstrates the toll of the war on the regular soldiers.  Regular soldiers desired peace, but they were not about to let it be at the expense of their personal sacrifice, or the sacrifice of those they served with in blue or grey, but those from their own state. 

One of the closing scenes from The Red Badge of Courage (1951) is between Confederate prisoners and Union soldiers.  They ask where each other are from.  They both mention the states they came from and say they have not met anyone from those states before.  Gettysburg paints a much clearer picture of the role of state identity.  Throughout the first half of the movie, Chamberlain is dealing with a group of men from a different Maine regiment who deserted.  He appeals to their sense of identity to Maine to rejoin the war, to fight for their state and the people in their state.  Later in the movie, Longstreet evokes the same sentiment with a Virginia regiment.  Sheehan-Dean’s essay on enlistment in Virginia claims that defending the state of Virginia, just prior to the war, was the same as defending the institution that defined their economic and social lives: slavery.  Charles Brewster mentioned a collective “Massachusetts blood” with regard to sentiment so broad as to encompass his whole unit.

If we can suppose that movies reflect the perceptions, ideologies, and ethos of the American audience, then we can surmise how Americans viewed and interpreted the Civil War and those who fought in it at the time the movies were produced.  The Red Badge of Courage was made in the afterglow of World War II and the beginning of the Korean War.  While the movie is based on a book from the late 19^th century, the personal conflicts encountered would resonate with the millions who were caught up in WWII.  The movie demonstrates personal battles in armed conflict, the need for bravery, and reliance on their fellow soldiers.  Gettysburg was produced in 1993, following the First Gulf War and around the time of U.S. involvement in Somalia. The movie might be a demonstration of Americans’ quest for peace, at home and abroad.  As with the previous movie, it is mainly concerned with personal interaction, between soldiers in their respective armies, and their interactions with soldiers from opposite armies.  In neither movie are soldiers portrayed as abolitionist or pro-slavery zealots; rather, they are portrayed as humans caught in a vicious, bloody conflict whose larger meaning had been skewed over the duration of the war. 

Whatever the reason for soldiers entering the war, the ravages soon weighed heavy.  From misguided military strategy to officer inability, all soldiers, including those same officers, risked much for preservation – preservation of a nation or of a way of life.  Through the rifle and cannon smoke, the comrades soldiers relied on were their own statesmen: an important rallying cry for identity and why they were even there.

Brains: Philosophical Zombies, Thought Experiments and Consciousness

Brains: Philosophical Zombies, Thought Experiments and Consciousness

The thought experiment of the philosophical zombie has found itself an audience of supporters and detractors.  Modern adaptations of this concept have extended further to include entire worlds populated by the philosophically undead.  This philosophical zombie asks us to thing about the nature of consciousness, all the while pondering whether zombies can exist.  Additionally, this experiment demonstrates the limitations of thought experiments and the limitations of our own consciousness.  In this essay, the most common explanation of the philosophical zombie will be expressed.  The various sides of the thought experiment will be explained as well.  The conclusion will demonstrate how this particular experiment fails. 

The thought experiment of the philosophical zombie was written about extensively by David Chalmers in his 1996 book The Conscious Mind.  This work built on the prior ideas of philosophers like Saul Kripke.  The philosophical zombie is a creature, not a person, who is, molecule for molecule identical to an ordinary living, breathing human being, except for one important difference; the zombie has no consciousness.  It looks and feels just like any sentient being on the planet but does not feel or think.  This zombie twin has physical function and physiological organization the same as people.  Additionally, behavior is replicated by neurologic function.  For example, should the zombie be prodded with a red hot fireplace stoker then the zombie would react in the same painful manner as any ‘normal’ human.  Since we can conceive of such a creature, as the argument goes, they are possible, at least metaphysically.  Had the circumstances of the natural world been different, zombies could have very well existed or exist (Kobes, 2007).  Ultimately, the experiment is an argument against the idea that everything in our world has a physical basis, including consciousness. 

The debate today is rather vigorous.  Some argue that any zombie like that in this thought experiment could not be exactly like us.  Aspects of our perception, a part of our consciousness, would not be available to the zombie.  And, if our consciousness is a causal relationship between sensory inputs and behavioral outputs, there is no way for the zombie to be, molecule for molecule, like a person (Pratt, 2013).  Essentially, if it walks like a human and it quacks like a human then it must be a human.  Others argue that a zombie could evaluate their visual perceptions in terms of environmental contrast and behaving in that environment.  The counter argument is that since the zombie lacks a ‘normal’ consciousness, experiences and perceptions are not a factor.   Another group of philosophers state that, once a zombie comes into being and begins interacting with its environment that those experiences start to form a type of consciousness (Pratt, 2013).    A fourth group argues that any being, or creature, with analytical mechanisms, would experience consciousness.  If this philosophical zombie is biologically identical to sentient humans, then they would experience some sort of consciousness (Loosemore, 2009).  As zombies search for brains, they must interact with their environment and analyze and experience their surroundings.  Some do not argue about the veracity of the philosophical zombie, rather they state that the argument itself is circular and, therefore, not valid.  The idea that something physically identical to a human being but lacking subjective experience would assume that subjective experiences do not produce consciousness, which is what the experiment is trying to prove (Brown). 

All of these stances, arguments and counter arguments suppose that we know something about consciousness.  However, this supposition leads to a very difficult problem, what Chalmers calls the ‘hard problem.’  To date, no scholar, philosopher or academic has proved, convincingly, a casual explanation of how and why we are conscious.  There has been no conclusive evidence showing that we are not, in fact, zombies (Harnad).  To many, consciousness has multiple meanings.  Consciousness can mean that a being is ‘awake,’ alert and aware of one’s surroundings.  Taken a step further, it can also mean that the ability to have intentions, purposeful thoughts and behaviors.  To conceive of a thing is also to conceive of what that thing lacks.  Therein lies the problem.  How can we conceive of a thing that cannot, itself conceive of that thing that we cannot even define (Loosemore, 2009)?

It is very easy for any individual to conceive of zombies.  The Walking Dead, Sean of the Dead, Night of the Living Dead and Zombieland are but a few examples of zombies in popular media.  As such, zombies are definitely possible in one’s imagination.  This thought experiment is based on the assumption that what we can conceive must be possible.  This shows a limitation of thought experiments themselves.  All thought experiments, from the Chinese Room to a tree falling in the forest, rely on conceiving a certain set of properties.  And, while truth might be stranger than fiction, the fictions that can be conceived by humans can be complex and varied.  Ultimately, any conceived parameters and properties are just that: fictions created in one’s imagination. 

A better thought experiment could easily be found.  One would be to simply imagine two identical human beings living on two different planets.  One could be called Bob(Earth) and Bob(Mars) and their consciousness could be debated.  However, there already exist two identical individuals on this planet: identical twins.  We can call this the Twins Experiment.  Their experiences can be created and conceived.  Then, their consciousness can be debated and examined.  Various philosophers and scholars can publish volumes on the subject.  Perhaps, this experiment may yield some answers; perhaps, it may arrive at a definition of what constitutes consciousness.

However, for the sake of the thought experiment, this author will ponder whether such a creature could exist and what it might mean for our consciousness.  Zombies lack agency, the ability to perform actions in the world.  Performing behaviors requires some thought, some ability to have a meaningful actions, even if it is only for brains.  Therefore, any actions made by such a zombie must be governed by extraneous electrical impulses that can contract muscles or by our autonomous and parasympathetic nervous systems.  However, it seems implausible that, without a consciousness, we would only want to consume human flesh.  If that were the case, that zombies function on mere impulse, but can we call the unfortunate soul on hospital life support a zombie?  After all, they could react to certain stimuli.  It would hardly seem appropriate to call them zombies.  Perhaps this is because we conceive of zombies like those in 28 Days Later.  Supposing that zombies are logically possible requires at least two beliefs.  First, that something can be true if it can be conceived.  Simply put, zombies are not possible with the current natural order of things.  Put another way, the existence of zombies have not empirical truth.  The reality of a philosophical zombie requires belief in conceptual truth, that what can be imagined has the ability to be real.  Second, that consciousness must be something that transcends words which would draw into question the appropriateness and veracity of any thought experiment dealing with consciousness.  After all, a thought experiment ceases to be a thought experiment if they are so implausible as to elicit more discussion about the validity of the experiment than engagement with the experiment itself.

References

Brown, R. (2010). Deprioritizing the a priori arguments against physicalism. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 17(3-4), 47-69.

Harnad, S. (1995). Why and how we are not zombies. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 1(2), 164-167. 

Kobes, B.W. (2007). Functionalist Theories of Consciousness.  In T. Bayne, A. Cleeremans & P. Wilken (Eds.), Oxford Companion to Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Loosemore, R.P.W. (2009). Consciousness in human and machine: A theory and some falsifable predictions. In B. Goertzel, P. Hitzler & M. Hutter (Eds.), Proceedings of the Second Conference on Artificial General Intelligence (Arlington, March 2009). Paris: Atlantis Press.

Pratt, M. (2013). Redefining the class of qualitative states – A reply to Shoemaker. Res Cogitans, 4(1), 52-62.